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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF SAN ANTONIO V.
RODRIGUEZ IN THE WAKE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S QUEST TO LEAVE NO CHILD
BEHIND
SARAH G. BOYCE†
ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1950s, a sea change in public education has taken
place. Public education—a policy concern traditionally reserved to
the states—has become a core concern of the federal government.
This Note surveys three of the federal government’s most significant
appropriations of power: the enactment of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965; the creation of the
Department of Education in 1980; and the passage of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the most recent, and easily most
expansive, iteration of the ESEA. This Note also considers the
manner in which the Supreme Court has facilitated federal control
over education, despite the Court’s refusal to recognize a formal right
to education. Finally, this Note argues that the federal government’s
incursion into the realm of public education has established an
implicit right to education that has rendered San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision that denied the
existence of a fundamental right to education, obsolete.
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INTRODUCTION
“The era of big Government is over,” President Clinton declared
1
in his 1996 State of the Union Address. “[B]ig Government does not
2
have all the answers.” This sentiment, though perhaps surprising
coming from a Democratic president, reflects a widely acknowledged
rhetorical shift in American politics in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries: a transition away from the parlance of Great
Society liberalism in the 1960s and toward aphorisms advocating
3
smaller-government conservatism. Yet the political discourse
surrounding one core issue of social policy has followed a
diametrically opposite trajectory. Since the 1960s, the executive and
legislative branches have discussed in increasingly grandiose terms
the appropriate role of the federal government with respect to public
education. This rhetoric, moreover, has been translated into practice,
as the two branches have appropriated progressively more significant
aspects of the states’ traditional role in public education.
4
Since the first public schools opened in the 1840s, education has
5
been regarded as a quintessentially local responsibility. The
Constitution does not mention education; thus, under the Tenth
1. President William Jefferson Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 79, 79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
2. Id.
3. See GARETH DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROW: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM
JOHNSON TO REAGAN 1 (2007) (“Historians commonly conceive of American politics since the
1960s as a sustained reaction against Great Society liberalism. There is plenty of evidence to
support the notion of a rightward shift, be it in the form of election results, poll data (declining
numbers of Americans identifying with ‘liberalism,’ levels of trust in government), growing
inequalities of wealth and income, rates of incarceration, the proliferation of conservative think
tanks and lobby groups, the decline of organized labor, the composition of the Supreme Court,
the growth of evangelical Protestantism, welfare reform, or the declaration by Democratic
president Bill Clinton that ‘the era of big government is over.’ The list could easily be
extended.” (quoting Clinton, supra note 1, at 79)).
4. Michael W. Kirst, Turning Points: A History of American School Governance, in
WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?: THE TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14, 17
(Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[I]t is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.”); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential . . . to quality of the educational process.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.” (emphasis
added)); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.” (emphasis added)).
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6

Amendment, the power to control public education has traditionally
7
been reserved to the states. In fact, until the 1950s, the federal
government’s involvement in public education was virtually
8
nonexistent.
Local control over education, however, has been steadily eroding
9
since the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown v. Board of Education
10
decision in 1954. Local school boards and superintendents are
increasingly being forced to surrender their authority to the federal
government, leading some observers to call the remaining vestiges of
11
local control “endangered species.” Whereas local education
agencies used to be the sole arbiters of education policy, they are now
regularly relegated to “implementing other people’s goals and
12
priorities.” In conjunction with this decrease in state and local
autonomy, the federal government’s involvement in public education
13
has ballooned. As of 2011, Congress and the Department of
14
Education were funding more than sixty education programs, and by
2003, federal spending on education had grown to represent

6. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
7. See Kirst, supra note 4, at 16 (“In the early days of the republic, Americans distrusted
distant government and wanted important decisions made close to home, especially regarding
education. Thus the U.S. Constitution made no mention of schools, leaving control of education
to the states, and states then delegated a great deal of power to local school districts. . . . [T]he
doctrine of local control of public schools has occupied a special place in American political
ideology.”); Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an Unfunded Mandate or
a Promotion of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 196 (2008) (“State and local
governments have traditionally been responsible for providing education in the United States.
Education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution and is, therefore, reserved to the states
through the Tenth Amendment.”).
8. Patrick McGuinn & Frederick Hess, Freedom from Ignorance?: The Great Society and
the Evolution of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in THE GREAT SOCIETY
AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 289, 290 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds.,
2005).
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 42, 43
(“State and federal officials have been taking more and more control away from local school
districts for several decades.”).
11. Kirst, supra note 4, at 14.
12. Noel Epstein, Introduction to WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
13. Ryan, supra note 10, at 44.
14. Id.
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approximately 9 percent of the total revenue available for public
15
schools, up from 2.9 percent in 1950.
Curiously, although the federal government has continued to
encroach upon the states’ traditional role in education, both Congress
and the Supreme Court have opted not to establish any formal
federal right to education. Whereas all fifty states enshrine a right to
16
education in their state constitutions, Congress has declined to
17
advance an analogous amendment to the federal Constitution.
Similarly, beginning with its decision in San Antonio Independent
18
School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
19
refused to recognize education as a fundamental right.
Numerous legal scholars have zealously protested against
Rodriguez and its successors, calling on the Court to overturn that
line of precedent and affirmatively establish a federal right to
20
education. This Note contends that this wave of discontent is

15. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2010, at 260 tbl.180 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/
2011015.pdf.
16. Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative Assessments
of Adequate Education in State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 545,
560 (2010); Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The Right
to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1051 (2010).
17. Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr., proposed a resolution in 2005 that called for a
constitutional amendment declaring that “[a]ll persons shall enjoy the right to a public
education of equal high quality.” H.R.J. Res. 29, 109th Cong. (2005). And in his 1944 State of
the Union Address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt urged Congress to “implement[ an]
economic bill of rights” that included “[t]he right to a good education.” President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), reprinted in 1944–
45 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 41–42 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950).
18. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (noting that the
Court has never “accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ . . . which
should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual’s access to it”
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982)));
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285–86 (“As Rodriguez and Plyler [v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982),] indicate,
this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education
is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should
be accorded heightened equal protection review. Nor does this case require resolution of these
issues.”).
20. Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32
GA. L. REV. 475, 476 (1998); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of
Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111–13, 123 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
been “tragically wrong” in failing to recognize a fundamental right to education); Goodwin Liu,
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (contending that
the Fourteenth Amendment “authorizes and obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of
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superfluous—not because Rodriguez was properly decided, but
because actions of Congress and the executive branch in the sixty
years following the decision have established an implicit federal right
to education that is equivalent—and perhaps even superior—to any
21
right the Court might have established.
Part I of this Note tracks the expanding scope of congressional
authority over education by examining three of Congress’s most
substantial power grabs: the enactment of the Elementary and
22
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA); the creation of the
Department of Education; and the passage of the No Child Left
23
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the most recent version of the ESEA.
Part II then examines the Supreme Court’s complicity in the federal
government’s appropriations of power. Next, Part III introduces
Rodriguez and the canon of cases that have considered a federal right
to education. Finally, Part IV argues that Congress’s incursion into
public education has rendered the Court’s Rodriguez decision
obsolete. By enacting NCLB and empowering the Department of
Education to enforce it, Congress has implicitly established a federal
right to education, diminishing the need for the Court to recognize
such a right.
I. CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION OF POWER OVER EDUCATION
The road to an implicit federal right to education was paved
gradually over the second half of the twentieth century, as Congress
expanded the scope of the federal government’s authority over
education.

educational opportunity”); Ian Millhiser, Note, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing
the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 55 DUKE L.J. 405, 406–08
(2005) (offering a “progressive constitutional framework that includes a fundamental,
affirmative right to an adequate education” and calling upon the courts to implement such a
framework). But see Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right To Learn: The Uncertain
Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 783 (2008) (urging
advocates not to pursue a federal fundamental right to education in the existing political and
judicial climate).
21. Admittedly, some advocates of a federal right to education will be dissatisfied with an
implicit federal right to education, as opposed to a constitutional amendment. For further
discussion of this criticism, see infra Part IV.A.
22. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
23. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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For most of the nation’s history, the federal legislature limited
itself to supporting states’ efforts to educate the public, playing only a
24
negligible role in elementary and secondary education. The notion
that local control of education was “a desirable end in itself [wa]s a
virtually uncontested position, put forth by commentators, courts, and
25
government officials alike.” Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s,
however, the political landscape began to shift, as the civil rights
movement and President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty gained
26
traction. Motivated by a desire to improve educational equity and to
provide educational opportunities for disadvantaged students,
Congress embarked upon an unprecedented foray into public
27
education. This Part traces three of Congress’s most significant
incursions into the states’ traditional educational sphere. These three
legislative actions exemplify the federal legislature’s appropriation of
control over public education from the states and illustrate how
education has transitioned from being “perhaps the most important
28
function of state and local governments” to being a top priority of
the federal government as well.
A. Elementary and Secondary Education Act
The passage of the ESEA in 1965 “represented a sea-change in
29
federal involvement in a state function.” For the first time, the
federal government committed general federal aid to education, a
move many conservatives regarded as an encroachment upon the

24. Patrick McGuinn, The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New
Educational Federalism, 35 PUBLIUS 41, 48 (2005).
25. Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 905 (2006).
26. Cf. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 25 (“If any one legislative measure during Johnson’s first
year bore his distinctive stamp, then it was the War on Poverty. . . . [A]nd education was
presented as being the decisive weapon that would allow the antipoverty war to be won.”). See
generally ELIZABETH H. DEBRAY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY & EDUCATION: FEDERAL POLICY
DURING THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS 5–6 (2006) (describing the emergence of
“[p]overty as an issue on Capitol Hill” and the relationship between the passage of the ESEA
and President Johnson’s “larger legislative and political strategy”).
27. See McGuinn & Hess, supra note 8, at 289 (“[The ESEA] marked the first major
incursion of the federal government into K–12 education policy . . . . At the heart of the ESEA
was a powerful equity rationale for federal government activism to promote greater economic
and social opportunity.”).
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
29. David Karen, No Child Left Behind?: Sociology Ignored!, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
FEDERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY 13, 14–15 (Alan R. Sadovnik et al. eds., 2008).
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30

“last remaining bastion of traditional American federalism.” In the
century preceding the enactment of the ESEA, Congress had
considered providing unrestricted general aid to public schools thirty31
32
six times. All thirty-six times, Congress had declined to do so.
Congressional resistance broke down, however, following
33
President Johnson’s election in 1964. The Johnson administration
contended that state and local governments were not making
adequate strides toward alleviating poverty in America, and President
34
Johnson forcefully urged Congress to intervene. “With education,”
Johnson explained, “instead of being condemned to poverty and
idleness, young Americans can learn the skills to find a job and
35
provide for a family.” President Johnson encouraged Congress to
take a new approach to federal aid: rather than offering schools
completely unrestricted grants, President Johnson asked Congress to
provide grants specifically geared toward educating children who had
36
grown up in impoverished households.
Conservative members of Congress railed against President
37
Johnson’s progressive initiative. As Professors Patrick McGuinn and

30. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 10–11.
31. Kirst, supra note 4, at 22.
32. Id.
33. See DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6 (“[T]he passage of the ESEA signified the end of a
lengthy congressional stalemate in approving federal aid to schools.”); JULIE ROY JEFFREY,
EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, at 72 (1978) (“Upon
coming to the presidency in 1963, Johnson had unequivocally committed himself to the passage
of federal aid to education.”).
34. DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6–7. Various members of Congress echoed the president’s
call to arms. See, e.g., JOHN BRADEMAS, THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION: CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS ON CAPITOL HILL 76–77 (1987) (“Many of us in Congress . . . perceived that there
were indeed genuine needs—in housing, health, and education—to which state and city
governments were simply not responding. It was this inattention by state and local political
leaders, therefore, that prompted us at the federal level to say, ‘We’re going to do something
about such problems.’ And we did.”).
35. President Lyndon B. Johnson, The President’s News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 364,
365 (Apr. 1, 1965).
36. Kirst, supra note 4, at 23; see also DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6 (“Prior legislative
histories concur that a central reason for [the ESEA’s] passage was that its proponents
advanced it as a ‘special purpose’ bill for the neediest students. It was not to be general aid,
opposed for decades out of a fear of federal control and the inability to settle religious and
racial conflicts.”).
37. See, e.g., JEFFREY, supra note 33, at 80–81 (describing Representative Charles
Goodell’s opposition to the bill); see also HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE UNCERTAIN TRIUMPH:
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS, at xv (1984) (“[T]o
propose federal ‘intrusion’ into the sanctity of the state-local-private preserve of education was
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Frederick Hess explain, the ESEA marked “the first major incursion
of the federal government into K–12 education policy,” and many
senators and representatives were wary of President Johnson’s
38
proposed “era of federal involvement in school reform.” For years,
antistatist conservatives, determined to thwart federal intrusion into
an area they regarded as an exclusive realm of the states, had formed
39
majorities to block the passage of any general-aid legislation.
Opponents of the ESEA argued that the federal government had no
constitutional prerogative to get involved in public education and that
passing the law would be an affront to federalism that would
40
inevitably lead to federal control of public schools.
Proponents of the bill disagreed. According to President
Johnson, the ESEA would serve only to “strengthen State and local
41
agencies.” U.S. Commissioner for Education Francis Keppel
reiterated the president’s message, “express[ing] ‘sympathy’
for . . . superintendents . . . but . . . indicat[ing] that [their] fear of
42
Federal control was not well founded.” Commissioner Keppel
stressed the fact that states would retain the authority to distribute
43
and regulate the federal funds they received as they saw fit. The
ESEA would, according to the Johnson administration, simply form a
to stride boldly into a uniquely dangerous political mine field that pitted Democrat against
Republican, liberal against conservative, . . . federal power against states rights, white against
black, and rich constituency against poor in mercurial cross-cutting alliances.”).
38. McGuinn & Hess, supra note 8, at 289. For many members of Congress, the ESEA also
raised troubling Establishment Clause concerns, as it provided government funds to parochial
schools. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 33–35, 42–43; see also Charles Mohr, President Signs
Education Bill at His Old School, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1965, at 1 (“[The ESEA] is the first time
Federal funds have been authorized to indirectly assist private, church schools. And it is the first
major, general aid to elementary education to get through Congress, where there has been
acrimonious disagreement on the church-state issue.”).
39. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 10.
40. EUGENE EIDENBERG & ROY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS: THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS AND THE MAKING OF EDUCATION POLICY 11 (1969); see also DAVIES, supra note 3, at
35 (explaining that some Republicans and Southern Democrats worried that the ESEA
“represented a sharp break with traditional models of federalism”).
41. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in Johnson City, Tex., upon Signing the
Elementary and Secondary Education Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 412, 413 (Apr. 11, 1965) (emphasis
added).
42. Leonard Buder, School Aid by U.S. Is Raising Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1965, at 45
(quoting Comm’r Keppel).
43. Id.; see also DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID
FEDERAL REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 3 (2009) (“Though the formula [established in the
ESEA] decided how much money states and localities would get, it decided nothing about how
that money would be spent—save that it was to be spent on the education of children from poor
families.”).
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new cooperative partnership between the states and the federal
44
government that would collectively transform public education.
President Johnson’s most persuasive talking point was that the
ESEA would provide federal funds to almost every congressional
45
district in the country. Title I of the ESEA pledged over $1 billion in
“financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas
46
with concentrations of children from low-income families.” To
allocate the funds, Congress instituted a formula that guaranteed
“annual grant[s] equal to half the cost borne by the state in educating
47
each child from a family with an income of $2,000 a year or less.”
The ESEA also appropriated funds to help schools purchase
48
textbooks and other educational materials. Ultimately, President
Johnson’s promises of massive federal grants for state coffers,
combined with the assurance that prescribing programs and projects
would be “left to the discretion and judgment of the local public
49
educational agencies,” were too enticing for legislators to pass up.
The ESEA flew through Congress astonishingly quickly for such a
50
significant piece of legislation, passing in just eighty-nine days.
Following the enactment of the ESEA, the concept of federal aid
for education rapidly won broad acceptance. Although four-fifths of
the Republican representatives and 44 percent of the Republican
senators had voted against the ESEA when it originally passed in
51
1965, by 1974, when the ESEA came up for renewal for the first
52
time, “conservative opposition had all but disappeared.” Within a
year, federal education spending had almost tripled—from
44. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: “Toward Full
Educational Opportunity,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 25, 26 (Jan. 12, 1965) (“In all that we do, we mean to
strengthen our state and community education systems. Federal assistance does not mean
federal control . . . .”).
45. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 35.
46. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, sec. 2, § 201, 79
Stat. 27, 27; see also Mohr, supra note 38 (“President Johnson signed today the $1.3 billion aidto-education bill . . . .”).
47. Mohr, supra note 38; see also Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 sec. 2,
§ 203, 79 Stat. at 28–30 (describing the grant formula).
48. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 201, 79 Stat. at 36. See generally
JEFFREY, supra note 33, at 76–77 (explaining the various titles of the ESEA).
49. S. REP. NO. 89-146, at 9 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1446, 1454.
50. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 37 (noting the relative ease with which Congress passed
the ESEA).
51. Id. at 1; 111 CONG. REC. 7718 (1965) (listing the fourteen Republican senators who
voted against the ESEA—44 percent of the thirty-two Republican senators who voted).
52. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2.
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53

$890,685,000 in 1965 to $2,408,209,000 in 1966 —and states and local
school districts had quickly come to rely on the ESEA’s annual
54
federal funding to keep their schools operating. In light of the
“difficult fiscal circumstances of the 1970s,” states—along with the
men and women representing their constituencies in Congress—
proved willing to overlook their federalism concerns in exchange for
55
these critical federal dollars.
As federal aid for education continued to gain popularity during
the Nixon and Ford administrations, the idea of a federal role in
education became firmly embedded in the fabric of American
56
politics. This ideological shift would later prove critical as the federal
government tried to garner support for its second major expansion
into the field of education: the creation of a federal Department of
Education.
B. Creation of the Department of Education
No congressional action has illuminated the shift toward greater
federal involvement in education more starkly than the creation of a
cabinet-level Department of Education in 1978. As Professor David
Breneman and journalist Noel Epstein wrote in a contemporaneous
op-ed, “Establishing a Cabinet-level department . . . [broke] with the
long tradition of a limited federal involvement in education and of
57
virtually no federal responsibility for schools . . . .” For decades,
education had been buried in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW), an agency whose staff was small and budget was
58
even smaller. The creation of the federal Department of Education

53. STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW, at vii–viii (1968).
54. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2.
55. Id.
56. See id. (“[T]he growing popularity of federal aid to education during the Nixon-Ford
years exemplifies a basic reality of American politics . . . : there are powerful inertial forces in
American political life, and they can work to preserve the liberal legacies of periods of reform
ferment in less propitious times just as much as they constrain innovation. Initially bold
departures in policy become embedded in the fabric of American politics, acquire a
constituency back home and supporting lobbies in Washington, and become, if not impregnable,
then at least firmly resistant to assault.”).
57. David W. Breneman & Noel Epstein, Op-Ed., Uncle Sam’s Growing Clout in the
Classroom, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1978, at D1.
58. When the U.S. Office of Education moved from the Department of the Interior to
HEW in 1950, it had a staff of three hundred and a budget of $40 million. Kirst, supra note 4, at
22–23. As of January 2012, the Department of Education had a staff of more than 4200 and
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forever “transformed the way education is governed in the United
States” and officially recognized, for the first time, that education is
59
an important federal responsibility.
Beginning in the early 1900s, members of Congress had
introduced more than 130 bills seeking to create a federal
60
Department of Education. For half a century, these bills had lacked
the support of the executive branch and had failed to gain momentum
61
with Democrats. Thus, much to the chagrin of education reformers,
the bills had languished and stalled year after year without ever being
62
considered in committee.
Abraham Ribicoff’s ascension to the Senate breathed new life
into the quest for a federal department dedicated exclusively to
63
education. Beginning in 1965, Senator Ribicoff, a former secretary of
HEW, faithfully introduced a “Department of Education Act” each
64
year. Ribicoff made little progress until 1974, when the little-known
65
governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, decided to seek the presidency.
One of Carter’s key campaign promises was his pledge to transform
the “complicated and confused and overlapping and wasteful federal
government bureaucracy” into “an efficient, economical, purposeful,
66
and manageable government.” Carter “opposed the proliferation of
executive agencies and . . . promised to cut their number from 1,900
67
to 200.” And with his plans to consolidate the twenty agencies that
were administering education programs into one central department,
Carter aimed to streamline the executive branch and eliminate

spent over $68.6 billion annually. The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
59. Breneman & Epstein, supra note 57.
60. ROBERT V. HEFFERNAN, CABINETMAKERS: STORY OF THE THREE-YEAR BATTLE TO
ESTABLISH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 40 (2001).
61. See id. (explaining that Jimmy Carter was the first “modern American President” to
commit to establishing a federal Department of Education).
62. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 231; see also HEFFERNAN, supra note 60, at 40 (“Congress had
not even taken one [of the bills to create the Department of Education] from the file drawer
since the 1950s.”).
63. Cf. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 361 n.44 (“Ribicoff . . . had long argued that [HEW] was
unmanageable and had been trying to break it up ever since he had joined the Senate.”).
64. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 14 (1978).
65. See HEFFERNAN, supra note 60, at 21 (declaring that once President Carter entered the
presidential race, “[t]eacher power . . . blossomed into a mature political force”).
66. Jimmy Carter, Our Nation’s Past and Future, Address Accepting the Presidential
Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York City (July 15, 1976)
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25953).
67. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 229.
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bureaucratic inefficiencies at HEW. In March 1977, just two months
after President Carter took office, Senator Ribicoff commenced
69
hearings on his annual bill to create a Department of Education.
This time, however, he enjoyed the backing of more than fifty
70
71
senators as well as the support of the administration.
Senator Ribicoff and his cosponsors garnered support for the bill
72
by emphasizing the government’s fragmented approach to education
73
and the need for a federal commitment to public schools. The Senate
report for Ribicoff’s bill argued that education needed a cabinet-level
secretary if it was going to receive any meaningful attention: “[T]he
American people need a highly visible, responsible, high-level
Federal official who can be held accountable for the successes or
failures of educational programs and policies . . . . Education needs a
strong advocate in Washington to speak for its needs and to assist in
74
solving its problems.” According to the report, “problems in
education [had] reached near-crisis proportions,” and the best way to
“aid” the “troubled state of education” was to create a federal
75
department.

68. Id.; DEANNA L. MICHAEL, JIMMY CARTER AS EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKER: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY AND EFFICIENCY 88 (2008). President Carter’s pledge to create a cabinet-level
Department of Education was also influenced by Carter’s sense of indebtedness to the National
Education Association (NEA). DAVIES, supra note 3, at 222. The NEA’s decision to endorse
Carter and the “massive support from teachers” that the endorsement subsequently guaranteed
were widely acknowledged to have been “crucial to [Carter’s] winning [the] election.” Id. at 228
(quoting Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s campaign manager) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 14.
70. Id.
71. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 233.
72. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 32,216 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy) (“[T]he
Federal education effort is greatly fragmented, resulting in an uncoordinated approach to
solving the many problems facing our Nation’s schools.”).
73. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 7 (“The [Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs]
believes the improvement of the Federal education effort must be a major priority. But
education will never be a priority as long as it is smothered in layers of bureaucracy, fragmented
across several Federal agencies, and diminished by a severe lack of attention in our National
Government.”); 124 CONG. REC. 32,215–16 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy) (“This
is a question of national priorities. I think it is about time we really state that education must be
one of our highest priorities. It is the duty and the responsibility of . . . the U.S. Senate . . . to
determine whether or not the structure [of the government] assigns a high enough priority to
education when it is buried so deep in a department that spends 95 percent or 94 percent of its
resources in some other areas.”).
74. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 11.
75. Id. at 7–8.
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Senator Ribicoff’s bill, Senate Bill 991, faced zealous opposition
from senators who believed the creation of a Department of
Education would usurp state control and expand the role of the
federal government in public education. Senator Harrison Schmitt,
for instance, delivered the following remarks:
[Our] locally controlled educational system is under attack by those
who believe . . . that there is a national elite which can better govern
the people than can the people themselves. . . .
....
Education in the United States has traditionally been the
responsibility of local and State authorities. By its silence on
education, the Constitution specifically leaves control to the
individual States. . . .
....
There is no question that the United States must have a deep
commitment to education; our future depends on that commitment.
The commitment, however, must be met through local and State
control of education . . . . [T]here is no reason to believe, nor is there
any historical evidence to prove, that the quality of education will be
improved by the increased Federal control that a new Department
77
of Education would encourage.

Those senators who supported the bill, however, fought back
against Senator Schmitt and other like-minded members of Congress,
insisting that a cabinet-level Department of Education would not
78
diminish local control over public schools. In fact, the original

76. Department of Education Organization Act, S. 991, 95th Cong. (1977).
77. 124 CONG. REC. 32,182–83 (1978) (statement of Sen. Harrison Schmitt); see also id. at
32,183 (“The people of the United States want less government and not more. They want less
governmental control and not more. They want less regulations and not more. Yet, the creation
of this new department will result in more government, more governmental control, and more
regulations in education than we have ever seen before.”); id. at 32,196 (“I would say that the
lack of mention of education in the Constitution, along with the reservation of powers to the
States, strongly suggests to this Senator that there was never any intent by the Founding Fathers
nor any intent subsequently, through recent decades, to have the Federal Government involved
in any significant way in the policymaking, in the administration, or other activities of the
educational system of this country.”).
78. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 161 (additional views of Sens. John C. Danforth &
William V. Roth, Jr.) (“The establishment of a Cabinet-level Department of Education is not in
any way intended or expected to result in expanded Federal involvement in education issues
that are the primary responsibility of States and localities. Rather, the new Department is
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Senate bill was revised to include a finding reiterating the argument
that the role of the federal government in education was not actually
79
expanding. According to the sponsoring senators, the federal
government would continue to leave questions of policy and
80
curriculum to state and local authorities. The Department of
Education would simply serve as an “assistant” to the states and
would use its resources to “supplement and complement” traditional
81
educational authorities.
This battle over the constitutional significance of a federal
Department of Education did not end even after President Carter
82
signed Senate Bill 991 into law on October 17, 1979. For nearly
twenty years, the creation of the Department of Education continued
to generate conflict and draw ire from those who rejected such a large
83
federal role in education. The promised abolition of the Department
of Education was a central feature of several Republican presidential
84
candidates’ platforms during the 1980s and 1990s. In his first State of
intended to strengthen the capacity of States, localities, and private institutions to meet their
educational needs.”).
79. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 103(a), 93 Stat.
668, 670 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (2006)) (“It is the intention of the Congress in
the establishment of the Department to protect the rights of State and local
governments . . . and to strengthen and improve the control of such governments and
institutions over their own educational programs and policies. The establishment of the
Department of Education shall not increase the authority of the Federal Government over
education or diminish the responsibility for education which is reserved to the States and the
local school systems and other instrumentalities of the States.” (emphasis added)); 124 CONG.
REC. 32,211 (1978) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff) (“[T]he Senators . . . had the findings
and purposes of the original bill changed to assure that local control would be preeminent, and
this new department would really supplement, complement, and assist local governments.”).
80. See S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 11 (“But effective management does not mean ‘more
control.’ The responsibility for education policy and curriculum will remain at State, local and
private levels.”).
81. Id. at 8.
82. Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of
Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2010).
83. See McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54 (noting that not until “the late 1990s” did
“congressional Republicans drop[] their proposals to eliminate the Department of Education
and to cut federal education spending”).
84. Veronique de Rugy & Marie Gryphon, Elimination Lost: What Happened to
Abolishing the Department of Education?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 11, 2004, 9:14 AM), http://
www.nationalreview.com/articles/209477/elimination-lost/veronique-de-rugy. Several candidates
seeking the Republican presidential nomination in 2012 have revived this trend, pledging to
abolish or drastically shrink the Department of Education should they be elected. See Trip
Gabriel, G.O.P. Anti-Federalism Aims at Education, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A28 (“[T]he
quest to sharply shrink government that all the Republican candidates embrace . . . has brought
a sweeping anti-federalism to the fore on education . . . .”). Despite these candidates’ promises,
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85

the Union Address, President Reagan renewed an earlier campaign
86
promise to dismantle the Department of Education, and Senator and
presidential candidate Bob Dole declared that he intended to “cut out
87
the Department of Education” while on the campaign trail in 1996.
The Department of Education also faced regular organized attacks
88
from members of Congress in the twenty years after its creation. In
January 1995, for instance, several members of Congress “declared
their intent to dissolve the [Department of Education] and turn
89
programs over to the states.”
90
Each of these resistance efforts ultimately fizzled, and by the
late 1990s, Republicans had been forced to abandon their quest to
the elimination of the Department of Education seems unlikely. See infra notes 217–18 and
accompanying text.
85. President Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting
on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 72 (Jan. 26, 1982).
86. REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1980 (1980),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844 (“[T]he Republican Party
supports deregulation by the federal government of public education, and encourages the
elimination of the federal Department of Education.”); MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION
AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: NATIONAL EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 15 (2009); see also DAVIES, supra note 3, at 245 (“[Reagan]
believed that [the creation of the Department of Education] was a dangerous development and
pledged to dismantle it, as part of a broader effort to return responsibility for the schools back
to the states.”).
87. The Department of Education, PBS NEWSHOUR (Fall 1996), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/backgrounders/department_of_education.html (quoting Sen. Dole) (internal
quotation mark omitted). The official GOP party platform similarly declared:
Our formula is as simple as it is sweeping: the federal government has no
constitutional authority to be involved in school curricula or to control jobs in the
work place. That is why we will abolish the Department of Education, end federal
meddling in our schools, and promote family choice at all levels of learning.
REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1996 (1996), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848#axzz1cZohA9Fc.
88. See de Rugy & Gryphon, supra note 84 (“While the Republican congresses of the mid1990s are most famous for their efforts to eliminate the department, their goal was not a new
one. Conservatives had talked about eliminating the department since its creation by President
Carter.”).
89. DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 1; see also id. (“The great federal experiment in education is
over. It is failed. It is time to move on.” (quoting Rep. Joe Scarborough) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
90. President Reagan’s reversal was particularly notable. An outspoken critic of the
Department of Education, Reagan fought bitterly against the expanding federal role in
education. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 246–47. At the end of Reagan’s first term, however, the
president’s most significant accomplishment in education was his commission of NAT’L COMM’N
ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL
REFORM (1983), an official report that assessed the quality of American schools and compared
them with those in other advanced nations, id. at 1. This report’s somber diagnosis—that the
country was “at risk” because of “disturbing inadequacies” in the American educational
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eliminate the Department of Education. A Nation at Risk, the
93
official report on education commissioned by President Reagan,
helped “stimulate a national conversation about educational
94
excellence” that “revolutionize[d] the federal role” in education.
Responding to voters, who ranked education at the top of their
agendas during the 1996 presidential election, Republicans were
forced to “put forward their own vision for federal educational
95
leadership.” By 2000, conservatives had abandoned their states’rights and small-government principles in the realm of public
education, as political considerations ultimately superseded the
96
party’s federalist concerns.
This dramatic shift paved the way for President George W. Bush
to introduce the “most significant overhaul and expansion of the
97
federal role in education since [the ESEA]”: No Child Left Behind.
C. No Child Left Behind
In their landmark 1968 book chronicling the enactment of the
ESEA, Professors Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher ominously
foretell the “profound consequences” the ESEA will have on
“American education and . . . the American Federal system
98
generally.” By enacting the ESEA, they contend, Congress has used
its spending power to “plunge[] the Federal government smack into
99
the middle of the total educational enterprise.” Professors Bailey
and Mosher note, “The fact is that once the [Spending Clause] is
interpreted liberally, it is impossible to set limits to the extent of
process, id. at 5, 18—catapulted education to the front of the American consciousness, see
VINOVSKIS, supra note 86, at 17 (“A Nation at Risk hit a very responsive chord . . . .”). As the
public called for national education reform, President Reagan’s vision of a diminished federal
role in education quickly eroded; in his second inaugural address, the president made no
mention of abolishing the Department of Education. See President Ronald Reagan, Inaugural
Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 55 (Jan. 21, 1985).
91. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54.
92. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., supra note 90.
93. See supra note 90.
94. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 275.
95. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54.
96. Id. at 55–56. A decade later, several candidates for the 2012 Republican presidential
nomination renewed the debate, see supra note 84, and in January 2011, Senator Rand Paul
introduced a bill that would have defunded almost all of the Department of Education’s
programs, see Cut Federal Spending Act of 2011, S. 162, 112th Cong. § 7 (2011).
97. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 41.
98. BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 53, at vii.
99. Id. at 3.
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100

Federal involvement in public education.” Bailey and Mosher scoff
at the notion that Congress is actually limited by its “constitutional
101
authority.” Unless Congress chooses to exercise self-restraint, they
warn, the federal government will continue to “move[] massively into
areas of educational support formerly deemed the exclusive province
102
of State and local governments.”
Although the words of Professors Bailey and Mosher perhaps
seemed hyperbolic in the 1960s, they seem clairvoyant in the twentyfirst century. In the four decades following the enactment of the
ESEA, Congress indeed tested constitutional limits and used its
spending power to infringe further upon state and local governments’
103
traditional
authority.
NCLB,
Congress’s
most
recent
reauthorization of the ESEA, provides a new paradigm for the
balance of power in education that is remarkably consistent with
Bailey and Mosher’s predictions. “[A]n unprecedented extension of
federal authority over states and local schools,” NCLB completely
obfuscates the traditional dividing line between federal and state
104
roles in education. Since its enactment in 2002, local control has
become a virtual anachronism, and Congress’s ability to direct
105
education policy and reform seems limitless.
In a clear break from the small-government conservatism of the
106
Reagan era, NCLB was enacted under President George W. Bush.
100. Id. at viii.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 4–15 and accompanying text. Using its spending power, Congress has
passed numerous landmark pieces of legislation—for example, Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1685 (2006)); section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1758 (2006)); and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)).
Umpstead, supra note 7, at 197–98.
104. Andrew Rudalevige, The Politics of No Child Left Behind, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2003, at
63, 63.
105. See infra notes 116–37 and accompanying text.
106. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 5 (“The fact that so prescriptive a measure was sponsored
by President George W. Bush, a Republican, and enacted by a GOP-dominated Congress
illustrated anew that conservatives had traveled a long way since the enactment of ESEA,
decisively abandoning the small government faith of their forefathers.”); David E. Sanger, Bush
Pushes Ambitious Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1 (“[T]he Bush
plan . . . demonstrated how much the Republican Party’s position has changed to conform to
Mr. Bush’s initiative. In 1994, one of his party’s rallying cries was the elimination of the
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Unlike the Republicans of the 1980s and 1990s, who had lobbied
tirelessly for federal withdrawal from the field of public education,
107
President Bush advocated a strong role for the federal government.
“Change will not come by disdaining or dismantling the Federal role
108
of education,” Bush argued. “[E]ducational excellence for all is a
109
national issue . . . .”
Yet President Bush insisted that an increased federal role would
110
not equate to decreased local control or upset the federal balance.
“[E]ducation is primarily a state and local responsibility,” Bush
111
112
explained.
“I believe strongly in local control of schools.”
According to President Bush, NCLB would offer states
“unprecedented freedom and flexibility” in exchange for increased
113
accountability.
States would be required to measure student
114
performance more rigorously, but in exchange, the president
pledged that his administration would “pass power back from
115
Washington, D.C., to [the] states.”
Although President Bush’s stated intentions may have been
sincere, the notion that NCLB preserved local autonomy has been
116
thoroughly discredited in the years following its enactment. NCLB
Department of Education. Under Mr. Bush’s plan, it would become significantly more powerful,
overseeing the yearly assessments of how schools and states have progressed.”).
107. Rudalevige, supra note 104, at 65; see also Kirst, supra note 4, at 31–32 (“Thus,
Republican presidents had done an about-face, going from Reagan’s desire to dismantle the
U.S. Department of Education to Bush’s dramatic expansion of Washington’s power over
education.”).
108. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Submitting the Education Reform Plan to the
Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 11, 12 (Jan. 23, 2001).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Note, supra note 25, at 888.
111. GEORGE W. BUSH, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 1 (2001), available at http://ed.gov/nclb/
overview/intro/presidentplan/proposal.pdf.
112. Bush, supra note 108, at 12; see also Ronald Brownstein, Bush Moves To Reposition
Republicans on Education, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A12 (“The core of Bush’s plan is his
belief that ‘authority and accountability must be aligned at the local level’ . . . .” (quoting Bush,
supra note 108, at 13)).
113. George W. Bush, Gov. George W. Bush’s Plans for Education in America, 82 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 122, 125–26 (2000); see also BUSH, supra note 111, at 7 (“Accountability for
student performance must be accompanied by local control and flexibility.”).
114. BUSH, supra note 111, at 7.
115. Sue Kirchhoff, Schools Bursting with Issues, 58 CQ WKLY. 112, 113 (2000) (quoting
then-Governor George W. Bush) (internal quotation mark omitted).
116. See, e.g., Karen, supra note 29, at 17 (“One might wonder how Bush was able to bring
such overwhelming majorities in Congress (381–41 in the House and 87–10 in the Senate) to
support a bill that infringed on the prerogatives of so many, often cross-cutting, constituencies.
States, districts, schools, and teachers have lost autonomy.”); Pinder, supra note 82, at 10 (“On
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“imposes unprecedented requirements on the states and
117
localities . . . it funds,” thereby mandating several substantive policy
118
directives. First, NCLB orders states to develop plans that establish
“challenging academic content standards” and “challenging student
119
academic achievement standards.” To determine whether students
are meeting these rigorous standards, states must “implement[] a set
of high-quality, yearly student academic assessments” and must test
120
students in third through eighth grades annually. States must also
administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
biennially to test the rigor of their standards and to provide a measure
121
of comparability among the states.
Perhaps most significantly, NCLB mandates “unprecedented
gathering, analysis, and reporting of data by state education
122
agencies.”
States must publish their test results annually to
demonstrate that a sufficient percentage of students have made
“adequate yearly progress” (AYP) toward “proficient” academic
123
achievement on the state assessments. Because one of NCLB’s
primary goals is to eliminate the educational achievement gap, local
educational agencies do not report “average test performance in
124
schools, which can mask underperforming groups.” Instead, states
must disaggregate their assessment data for four specific subgroups:
(1) “economically disadvantaged students”; (2) “students from major
racial and ethnic groups”; (3) “students with disabilities”; and (4)
125
“students with limited English proficiency.” If each of the four
subgroups has made “continuous and substantial improvement[s],”
126
the school has made AYP.
the other hand, NCLB represented a sweeping change from the traditional roles of the various
levels of government in education policy in that the federal role in educational achievement
went from extreme deference to the states and districts to a much more prescriptive role.”).
117. Ryan, supra note 10, at 45.
118. Andrew G. Caffrey, Note, No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion of the Clear
Statement Rule and the Unfunded Mandates Clause of No Child Left Behind, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1129, 1130 (2010); Note, supra note 25, at 889.
119. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A) (2006). States must
establish standards in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(C).
120. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A).
121. Id. § 6311(c)(2).
122. Kirst, supra note 4, at 32.
123. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(A)–(C).
124. Karen, supra note 29, at 16.
125. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II).
126. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)–(C). To achieve AYP, schools must also ensure that at least 95
percent of the students in each subgroup take the assessments. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii). By the
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Finally, as President Bush promised, NCLB imposes increased
accountability in the form of escalating actions against schools with
unsatisfactory academic results. Any school that fails to make AYP
127
for two consecutive years is “identif[ied] for school improvement.”
Schools in need of improvement face drastic sanctions: the statemonitored local educational agency may replace the school staff who
are relevant to the school’s failure to make AYP, may institute a new
curriculum, may restructure the internal organizational structure of
128
the school, or may extend the school year or school day. In addition,
students who are enrolled in a school that is identified for school
improvement are eligible to transfer to another public school in the
129
district.
The fact that NCLB, a law that “effected a substantial . . . power
130
grab of education policy from the states,”
passed with
overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both the House and the
131
Senate evidenced yet another shift in congressional thinking about
the proper role of the federal government in education. The
enactment of the ESEA was defended as a means of achieving
educational equity for disadvantaged students, and Congress
rationalized the creation of the Department of Education by citing
132
With NCLB, however,
staggering bureaucratic inefficiency.
Congress boldly seized legislative authority over two quintessential
areas of state control: academic achievement and education policy
133
and reform.
134
In United States v. Lopez, the Court expressed its concern that
too expansive an interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Clause
end of the 2013–2014 school year, every public school in America is expected to attain 100
percent proficiency in all four subgroups. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
127. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A).
128. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv).
129. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).
130. Note, supra note 25, at 886.
131. The House voted 381–41 in favor of NCLB, and the Senate count was 87–10. McGuinn,
supra note 24, at 57.
132. See supra notes 27, 34–36, 66–68, 72–75 and accompanying text.
133. See Kirst, supra note 4, at 36 (“When it was felt that states could not be relied upon to
meet achievement goals either, more decisionmaking moved to Washington, most recently with
NCLB.”); cf. Susan H. Fuhrman, Less than Meets the Eye: Standards, Testing, and Fear of
Federal Control, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 131, 131 (“When Washington
starts issuing mandates about standards for student learning and how to assess that learning,
controversies begin. Such policies, after all, have strong implications for school curriculums, and
federal control of curriculum has long been taboo.”).
134. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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power might enable the federal government to “regulate the
135
Congress might, for example,
educational process directly.”
136
“mandate a federal curriculum,” the Court warned. Though NCLB
was not enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power, its
enactment validates the Court’s concerns in Lopez. If Congress can
137
use $20 billion in funding to strong-arm states into enacting
standards, conducting regular standardized assessments, and
dedicating attention to the educational achievement gap, the
possibility that Congress might mandate a federal curriculum—or
anything else in the field of education, for that matter—seems very
plausible indeed.
II. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN THE FEDERAL
APPROPRIATION OF POWER
The federal appropriation of power has not been achieved by
Congress alone. The Supreme Court has been complicit in the
gradual seizure of control from state and local education authorities.
As many scholars have observed, the aggrandizement of federal
involvement in public education has been facilitated in large part by
the Supreme Court’s decision not to impose any meaningful
138
restrictions on Congress’s prodigious spending power. Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress has the “Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
139
the United States.” Although the meaning of “general welfare” has
140
been the source of considerable debate, the Supreme Court clarified

135. Id. at 565.
136. Id.
137. Kirst, supra note 4, at 23.
138. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 10, at 48–49 (“The expansive scope of Congress’s authority
under the Spending Clause is especially important in the field of education, for the simple
reason that most federal education programs have been enacted pursuant to this power.”);
Umpstead, supra note 7, at 203 (“In spite of its inability directly to regulate education, Congress
has passed a series of laws that have significantly influenced the educational program
throughout the country. To do this, Congress has utilized its spending power under Article I,
Section 8, clause 1 to induce the states to cooperate with its policies.”).
139. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
140. Two Framers, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, advocated opposing readings
of the Spending Clause. Ryan, supra note 10, at 49. Madison argued that Congress’s spending
power was restricted by its enumerated powers under the Constitution. Id. Hamilton believed,
however, that Congress could use its spending power to pursue goals outside of its enumerated
powers, as long as the spending advanced the general welfare. Id.
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the scope of Congress’s authority in United States v. Butler, holding
that Congress could use its spending power to regulate the states
142
indirectly in ways that it could not otherwise directly mandate.
143
In South Dakota v. Dole, the “most recent and thorough
144
pronouncement on the scope of the Spending Clause,” the Supreme
Court established five criteria for determining the constitutionality of
145
a conditional spending law. First, the spending legislation must be
146
“in pursuit of the ‘general welfare.’” Second, any conditional strings
must be stated clearly and unambiguously, enabling states to make an
147
informed choice whether to accept the federal funds. Third, the
conditions must be related to “the federal interest in particular
148
national projects or programs.” Fourth, Congress cannot use
conditional spending legislation to induce states to engage in activities
149
that are unconstitutional. Fifth, the financial inducement associated
with the legislation cannot be so coercive that it becomes
150
compulsive.
In the years following Dole, these five requirements have proved
151
to be “entirely toothless.” The Court has not enforced any of the
five restrictions with any zeal and has exhibited extreme deference in
considering whether a particular expenditure serves the general

141. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
142. Id. at 66 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution.”).
143. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
144. Ryan, supra note 10, at 50.
145. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08, 211. In Dole, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
legislation that conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds on states’ willingness to enact
laws raising the legal drinking age. Id. at 205–06.
146. Id. at 207 (quoting Comm’r v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at
65).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 207–08.
149. Id. at 208.
150. Id. at 211.
151. Note, supra note 25, at 891; see also Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the
Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2003) (“It was
suggested, and perhaps even expected, that the Dole exceptions . . . would be swept into the
maelstrom of a post-Lopez revolution. Instead, New Federalism notwithstanding, Congress’s
essentially unquestioned power to spend money, with regulatory strings attached, continues to
provide practically limitless opportunities for the national government indirectly to shape policy
at the state and local levels of society and government.” (footnote omitted)).

BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF RODRIGUEZ

1/25/2012 10:42 PM

1047

152

welfare. In fact, the Court has rejected every federalism-based
153
challenge to federal appropriations legislation since 1936. This
remarkably deferential disposition has allowed Congress to invoke its
spending power to circumvent traditional federalism parameters and
to disrupt the federal-state balance that has long existed with respect
154
to public education.
In the education sphere, the Court’s expansive reading of the
Spending Clause has afforded Congress “almost unfettered discretion
155
to direct the education policies of the states.” Major pieces of
education legislation like the Individuals with Disabilities Education
156
Act (IDEA) and NCLB offer states millions of dollars in federal
grants in exchange for compliance with increasingly stringent
157
educational requirements. Although states theoretically have the
power to reject Congress’s directives, their autonomy is in actuality
158
severely constrained. Cash-strapped states are increasingly being
forced to cede power to the federal government, allowing Congress to
159
transform itself into a monolithic dictator of education policy.
Although the Supreme Court’s role in the federal appropriation
of authority over education has taken a back seat to Congress’s, the
Court has been a powerful accomplice. Instead of checking the

152. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress.”); id. at 207 n.2 (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the
Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam))). For
examples of cases in which the Court has affirmed Dole’s deferential approach to the Spending
Clause, see Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–
96 (2006); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604–08 (2004); United States v. American Library
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 202–03 (2003); and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1992).
153. Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power To Circumvent City of Boerne v.
Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in Its Unconstitutional
Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469, 477 (2000).
154. Id. at 469–70.
155. Ryan, supra note 10, at 43.
156. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006).
157. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 44 (“All major federal programs, including Title I and
IDEA, provide money to states and localities, and the money comes with strings that, over the
years, have formed a tangled web of rules and regulations enveloping public schools.”).
158. See Michael Salerno, Note, Reading Is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act
Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 509, 538 (2007) (“While any state is free to decline to follow NCLB, a decision to do
so would result in the state’s loss of federal education assistance. This result is impractical for
states, as they are incapable of funding education without federal assistance.”).
159. Id.
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legislature’s influence, the judiciary has consistently exercised
restraint, and thus has facilitated the federal takeover.
III. THE FEDERAL REJECTION OF A FEDERAL RIGHT
Given the staggering pace at which Congress has expanded the
scope of its authority over education, one might reasonably conclude
that the federal government’s desire to engage in education reform
has no limits. Yet both Congress and the Supreme Court have refused
to venture beyond one particular frontier: neither the legislature nor
the judiciary has been willing to formalize a federal right to
education.
Congress’s rejection of a fundamental constitutional right to
education has been implicit; the legislature has simply never acted to
160
amend the Constitution and establish the right. Despite support
from various members of Congress and from at least one presidential
administration in favor of a constitutional amendment formalizing a
right to education, Congress has never seriously considered making
161
such a change.
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has explicitly considered the
issue. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme
162
Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of education.
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right
to education under the federal Constitution, even after the passage of
163
the ESEA and the creation of the Department of Education.
The seminal case regarding a federal fundamental right to
education is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In
that case, the parents of Mexican-American schoolchildren
challenged Texas’s school-finance system, arguing that their children
160. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“In addition, education provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.
In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which
should be diligently promoted.”).
163. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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were not receiving equal educational opportunities because of their
164
socioeconomic class. Due to its heavy reliance on local property
taxes, Texas’s funding scheme had generated substantial interdistrict
disparities: Edgewood, the poorest district in San Antonio, received
$356 in funding per pupil, whereas Alamo Heights, the most affluent
165
district, received $594 per pupil. The plaintiffs contended that these
dramatic funding disparities amounted to discrimination on the basis
of wealth and, thus, that they constituted a violation of their
166
children’s rights to equal protection.
To evaluate the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Court
questioned whether the state’s funding system “operate[d] to the
disadvantage of some suspect class or impinge[d] upon a fundamental
167
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.” The
Court first held that indigent individuals did not constitute a
protected class, noting that the plaintiffs had not been relegated to a
position of political powerlessness or absolutely deprived of any
168
meaningful benefit.
Next, despite affirming the “undisputed
importance of education,” the Court rejected the plaintiffs’
169
fundamental-right argument.
According to the Court, a
fundamental right to education is neither explicitly nor implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, even if education might be
considered a necessary prerequisite to the effective exercise of First
170
Amendment freedoms and the right to vote.
Although most courts have interpreted Rodriguez as precluding
a federal right to education, this reading oversimplifies the Court’s
171
nuanced holding. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first
164. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973).
165. Id. at 12–13, 15.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 23–24, 28.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id. at 33–37.
171. E.g., Greenspahn, supra note 20, at 768; see also Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez
Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 75, 83 (1980) (“[C]ontrary to a popular misconception of the Rodriguez holding,
the Court did not decide that education is not a fundamental right, but that the facts of
Rodriguez did not violate that right. Furthermore, there is no right to equal education per se,
but there may be a right to whatever quantum of education is required for the meaningful
exercise of other rights.” (footnote omitted)); Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible:
Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 197, 210–11 (2009)
(“[T]he idea that there may be a fundamental right to an identifiable quantum of education lives
on as Rodriguez’s ‘unheld holding.’ The Court recognizes this inconsistency, citing Rodriguez
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explained that education is not afforded explicit or implicit protection
172
under the Constitution. Justice Powell then, however, raised the
possibility that “some identifiable quantum of education” might be
constitutionally protected and that an “absolute denial of educational
opportunities” in other circumstances might interfere with a
173
fundamental right.
The Court took up the issue of a fundamental right to education
174
again in Plyler v. Doe, which held that Texas could not deny
175
undocumented children enrollment in its public schools. In Plyler,
the Court again equivocated. “Public education is not a ‘right’
176
granted to individuals by the Constitution,” the Court declared.
“But neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’
177
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”
Because of what it described as education’s “fundamental role in
178
maintaining the fabric of our society,” the Court applied heightened
179
scrutiny in analyzing Texas’s statute. This decision—to forgo
rational basis review in favor of some form of intermediate scrutiny—
seemed, in the words of one commentator, to “confirm that
Rodriguez left open the possibility that some level of education is a
180
constitutionally protected fundamental right.”
181
The Court last addressed this issue in Papasan v. Allain and
182
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools with ambiguous results. In
Papasan, a 1986 decision, the Court examined Mississippi’s
183
disbursement of land funds for public schools. Referencing both
both for the proposition that there is no fundamental right to education and for the proposition
that there may be a fundamental right to education.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Susan H.
Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A
Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 566 (1992))).
172. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
173. Id. at 36–37.
174. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
175. Id. at 230.
176. Id. at 221.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Exactly what level of scrutiny the Court actually applied is unclear, as the Court slightly
confused the standard terminology of equal protection: “In light of these countervailing costs,
the discrimination contained in [the Texas statute] can hardly be considered rational unless it
furthers some substantial goal of the State.” Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
180. Greenspahn, supra note 20, at 769.
181. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
182. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
183. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 267–68.
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Rodriguez and Plyler, the Court noted that “the question[] whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right” meriting
“heightened equal protection review” had not yet been definitively
184
settled. Two years later, in Kadrmas, the plaintiffs challenged their
school district’s decision to charge students for a door-to-door bus
185
service, contending that the user fees unconstitutionally deprived
186
indigent children of “minimum access to education.” This time, the
Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny, refusing to extend Plyler
187
beyond its “unique circumstances.”
After all, noted Justice
O’Connor, the Court had never “accepted the proposition that
education is a ‘fundamental right’ [that] should trigger strict scrutiny
188
when government interferes with an individual’s access to it.”
The precedential value of Rodriguez and its successors is unclear.
The only unequivocal truth that can be extracted from these four
cases is that a federally protected right to education has never been
affirmatively established.
IV. AN IMPLICIT FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR RODRIGUEZ
Since the Court decided Rodriguez in 1973, numerous legal
scholars have lambasted the decision and have articulated lengthy
189
pleas for the Court to recognize a fundamental right to education.
Professors Cass Sunstein, Laurence Tribe, and Erwin Chemerinsky,
three of the most renowned constitutional law scholars of their
190
generation, have all criticized Rodriguez and censured the Burger
Court for failing at such a “critical juncture in the battle for
191
educational equality.” This chorus of opposition has accused

184. Id. at 285.
185. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 453–55.
186. Id. at 458.
187. Id. at 459–60 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)).
188. Id. at 458 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
189. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
190. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 140 (1993); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-52, at 1654, § 16-58, at 1667 (2d ed. 1988); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure To Achieve Equal
Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1000 (1994).
191. Chemerinsky, supra note 190, at 999.
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Rodriguez of stalling the effort to equalize educational opportunity
192
and of forsaking the “majestic promise of Brown.”
In the face of Rodriguez’s widespread excoriation, a few scholars
have risen to the Court’s defense, arguing that the case was decided
193
correctly.
Professor Edward Foley, for example, asserts that
Rodriguez was decided correctly under both a “strict originalist” and
194
a “moral” reading of the Constitution. According to Professor
Foley, strict originalists evaluating Rodriguez need only cite the
Framers’ lack of any “specific intent to ban unequal levels of
spending per student among different school districts within a
195
state.” Professor Foley concedes that strict originalism may be a
“rather unattractive theory of constitutional interpretation” at times,
but he bolsters his strict-originalism argument with a moral reading of
196
the Equal Protection Clause. Although Professor Foley agrees that
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the “fundamental principle”
that all humans have equal intrinsic value, he maintains that
disparities in educational opportunities “do[] not necessarily violate
197
the principle of intrinsic equality.” Rather, just as Rodriguez
suggested, the Constitution requires only a minimum level of
198
educational opportunity. As Professor Foley himself hints, however,
his published support of Rodriguez places him in the minority among
199
legal scholars.

192. Id.
193. See, e.g., John Dayton, When All Else Has Failed: Resolving the School Funding
Problem, 1995 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 19–20 (“Although it may be tempting to embrace judicial
action as a panacea for school funding inequities, political reality dictates otherwise. Political
reality supports the Court’s conclusion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that ‘the ultimate solutions
must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.’”
(footnote omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973)));
Foley, supra note 20, at 541 (“If Rodriguez had imposed a requirement of equal educational
opportunity, as some prominent constitutional scholars still wish, the Court would have been
acting as tyrannical philosopher-kings, usurping the democratic authority of the people and
their elected representatives.”).
194. Foley, supra note 20, at 476–78. Professor Foley borrows the notion of a moral reading
of the Constitution from Professor Ronald Dworkin. Id. at 477 (citing RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–14 (1996)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 477–79.
197. Id. at 478–79.
198. Id. at 479.
199. See id. at 476–77 (noting the widespread criticism of Rodriguez within the legal
community and acknowledging that “academic commentators [have not] satisfactorily
defended” the case).
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Another scholar, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit,
contends that regardless of whether Rodriguez was rightly or wrongly
200
decided, the plaintiffs in the case “potentially gained by losing.” In
his article on the decision, Judge Sutton describes the states’ reaction
to Rodriguez and argues that the states were better equipped to
address the complex and diverse issues of school financing and
educational spending than the federal government was anyway:
As the Rodriguez story suggests, the answer to the pragmatist
judge’s question—“What happens if we do nothing?”—is not
invariably that the States will do nothing, and it occasionally may be
that the States will do more for a given cause than the federal courts
201
ever could have done.

This Note similarly contends that perhaps the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez “gained by losing,” though for different reasons from those
Judge Sutton articulates. This Part argues that Congress’s enactment
of NCLB, in conjunction with the Department of Education’s
growing prominence, has established an implicit federal right to
education that is equivalent, and perhaps even superior, to any right
the judiciary could identify and protect. Thus, even if the pervasive
derision Rodriguez inspired when it was handed down was well
founded, pleas for the Court to overrule the decision are now largely
unnecessary.
A. The Cases for and Against Implicit Legislated Rights
Whether legislation can implicitly establish a right is not a settled
202
question. The clearest rights, of course, are those that are explicitly
203
enshrined in positive law—the right to free speech, for example, or
the right to be free from sex discrimination when participating in an

200. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1978 (2008).
201. Id. at 1986.
202. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), for example, suggests that Congress
cannot confer a right unless it “‘speak[s] with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’
intent,” id. at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Similarly, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981), cautioned courts not to “attribute to Congress an unstated intent” and infer substantive
rights or private causes of action, particularly when such inferences would “impose affirmative
obligations on the States,” id. at 16–17; see also infra notes 205–07.
203. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
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204

educational program. Yet courts have also historically recognized
implicit rights that are not clearly enumerated in a specific textual
provision. For instance, under the doctrine of substantive due process,
courts have identified fundamental rights ranging from the right to
205
marry to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
206
children. These rights, although not mentioned in the Constitution,
are, according to the Court, protected either by the word “liberty” in
the Due Process Clause or by the “penumbras” of various
207
amendments in the Bill of Rights.
At the most basic level, when a court recognizes a right, it is
doing two things. First, the court is preserving some modicum of
208
positive or negative liberty. Second, the court is ensuring that a
209
remedy exists should that liberty be infringed. As the subsequent
Sections in this Part explain, these two things—preserving a liberty
interest and ensuring a remedy—are precisely what the passage of

204. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
205. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
206. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“Under the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [(1923)], we think it entirely plain that the [law in question]
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”).
207. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965) (“In other words, the
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion. . . . [S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”). Of course, a sizable contingent
of legal scholars, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, would contend that rights can be
established only if they are identified explicitly, whether in the text of the federal Constitution, a
state constitution, a statute, or a regulation. This Note’s argument, however, is not incompatible
with these scholars’ textualist approaches to the Constitution. This Note does not hinge on
whether the Constitution protects—or theoretically could protect—a substantive-due-process
right to education, nor does it aim to prove that implicit rights are legitimate or even possible.
Rather, this Note makes the more modest argument that the protections individuals enjoy under
NCLB and the auspices of the Department of Education are comparable to the protections
individuals would enjoy pursuant to a formalized right, whether it be enshrined in a constitution
or in a statute. See infra notes 209–62 and accompanying text.
208. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.” (emphasis omitted)).
209. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress.”); id. at 163 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).
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NCLB and the Department of Education’s role in enforcing NCLB
have accomplished.
The most immediate response to this proposition is that a right
recognized implicitly by Congress could never rival—and certainly
could never trump—a constitutional right. After all, constitutional
rights sit atop the hierarchy of rights in terms of the reverence they
210
enjoy, and they are virtually impossible to rescind. Thus, as this line
of thinking goes, those who deride the holding in Rodriguez have a
compelling reason to continue their chorus of opposition for as long
as a constitutional right to education is denied.
This argument, however, overestimates the value of an explicit
right recognized by the judiciary and underestimates the power of an
implicit right recognized by Congress. First, although constitutional
rights are nearly impossible to rescind, doing so is not impossible,
particularly when the right is not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution or a statute. As the oft-maligned case Lochner v. New
211
York demonstrates, implicit constitutional rights are not necessarily
irrevocable. Lochner infamously invoked a right to freedom of
212
contract, a right that was later abandoned in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
213
214
Parrish. Similarly, Dred Scott v. Sandford, another blight on the
Court’s record, affirmed “the right of property in a slave” and the
215
right of citizens to engage in slave trafficking. These rights were

210. Cf. Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1948) (“Clearly, the
general rule is that ‘powers derived wholly from a statute are extinguished by its
repeal.’ . . . This being true, so long as the claims, if they were purely statutory, had not ripened
into final judgment, regardless of whether the activities on which they were based had been
performed, they were subject to whatever action Congress might take with respect to them.”
(quoting Flanigan v. Sierra Cnty., 196 U.S. 553, 560 (1905))).
211. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
212. See id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.”).
213. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also id. at 392 (“But it was
recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified and not
an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.”
(quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
214. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
215. See id. at 451–52 (“[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed
in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and
property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it,
for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future
time, if the slaves escapes from his owner.”).
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later resoundingly rescinded with the passage of the Thirteenth and
216
Hence, although revoking implicit
Fourteenth Amendments.
constitutional rights that have been recognized by the Court might be
anomalous, even if Rodriguez had established an implicit
constitutional right to education, that right would not be indubitably
impervious to future attack.
Second, a right to education that has been implicitly recognized
by Congress—albeit easier to repeal than a constitutional right—is
unlikely to be eroded or rescinded, for pragmatic and political, if not
jurisprudential, reasons. When Congress establishes a new statutory
scheme, particularly a scheme that enshrines a right, the momentum
in favor of such a scheme and the “inertial forces” that often tie
217
Congress’s hands are unlikely to allow for a “bold” departure.
Having grown accustomed to policies that suggest a federal
commitment to education over five decades, the American people are
unlikely to support the federal government’s drastically scaling back
its commitment to public education. In effect, the implicit right to
education protected by NCLB and the Department of Education is
probably already so “embedded in the fabric of American politics”
that it has “become, if not impregnable, then at least firmly resistant
218
to assault.”
For these reasons, the contention that a constitutional right
affirmed by the Supreme Court would be the preeminent

216. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). The Court’s
shift in position from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), as well as its willingness to reconsider Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), further demonstrates
the potentially transitory nature of implicit constitutional rights recognized by the judiciary.
217. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2; see also Liaquat Ali Khan, A Portfolio Theory of Foreign
Affairs: U.S. Relations with the Muslim World, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 406
(2011) (“The President can request that Congress modify or repeal a certain statutory portfolio.
But such requests rarely materialize, because repealing a federal statute requires a new political
consensus in both chambers of Congress.”); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:
The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 505 n.66 (1997) (“The burden of inertia in
repealing existing legislation is another unavoidable consequence of a present generation’s right
to control the present.”).
218. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2.
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accomplishment for education advocates is cogent but not irrefutable
or insuperable; in fact, it may be misguided. In the following Sections,
this Note first compares the right to education that presumably would
have been established under Rodriguez with the right that has been
implicitly recognized by Congress under NCLB. It then defends the
hypothesis that the protections the Rodriguez Court could have
formalized would have been no more expansive than the protections
available under NCLB, insofar as those protections are enforced by
the Department of Education.
B. Equity- Versus Adequacy-Based Rights to Education
Rodriguez and the numerous state-finance cases that were
219
litigated under state constitutional provisions in its wake volunteer
220
two possible versions of a right to education. The first wave of cases
221
envisioned a right to education grounded in equity. The equitybased right to education guarantees equal educational opportunities
222
to all students, regardless of their race, gender, or disability. The
second wave of cases suggested a right to education grounded in
223
adequacy. The adequacy-based right to education focuses on the
quality of education students are receiving and demands that school
219. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Tenn.
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
220. See Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation:
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991 (2010)
(noting that advocates changed litigation strategy after Rodriguez “from seeking equitable
funding across all school districts to ensuring that all districts have sufficient funding to provide
their students an adequate education”); see also Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken
Duties: A New Theory for School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2011)
(describing three waves of cases but identifying the same two “distinct theories of legal action”).
221. E.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (en
banc); Serrano, 487 P.2d 1241; McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139. Some courts have alternatively used
the word “equality.” E.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 207.
222. See, e.g., McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 140–41 (“The provisions of the constitution
guaranteeing equal protection . . . require that the educational opportunities provided . . . be
substantially equal. The constitution, therefore, imposes upon the General Assembly the
obligation to maintain and support a system of free public schools that affords substantially
equal educational opportunities to all students.”).
223. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro,
488 S.E.2d 249; Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). Many scholars
actually discuss school-funding litigation in terms of three waves: “federal equality litigation,
state equality litigation, and state adequacy litigation.” Gillespie, supra note 220, at 991; see also,
e.g., Tang, supra note 220, at 1202. Because this Note is focused solely on the possibility of a
federal right to education, it has simply collapsed these “three waves” into two general visions of
what a right to education might look like.
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In creating the
districts meet certain minimum standards.
Department of Education and enacting NCLB, Congress unofficially
instituted a federal right to education that conforms with both of
these visions.
1. No Child Left Behind and an Equity-Based Right to Education.
225
In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Kentucky provided a useful explanation of an equity-based right to
education:
Each child, every child, . . . must be provided with an equal
opportunity to have an adequate education. Equality is the key word
here. The children of the poor and the children of the rich, the
children who live in poor districts and the children who live in rich
districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an
226
adequate education.

This vision is strikingly consistent with the vision set forth in NCLB,
which seeks to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and
227
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education.” Its
provisions embody Congress’s express purpose of “closing the
achievement gap . . . between minority and nonminority students, and
228
between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers.”
This objective is precisely what the litigants in equity-based education
lawsuits were seeking: the assurance that classifications like race and
socioeconomic status would not interfere with educational access and
229
opportunity.
In particular, NCLB’s disaggregation requirements help secure
this right. NCLB requires states to disaggregate the results of their
standardized tests by “race, ethnicity, gender, disability status,
migrant status, English proficiency, and status as economically
224. See, e.g., Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (“The principal question presented by this
argument is whether the people’s constitutional right to education has any qualitative content,
that is, whether the state is required to provide children with an education that meets some
minimum standard of quality. We answer that question in the affirmative and conclude that the
right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education. An
education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in
the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally
inadequate.”).
225. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
226. Id. at 211.
227. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (emphasis added).
228. Id. § 6301(3).
229. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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230

disadvantaged.” Under NCLB, a school cannot achieve AYP unless
students in each of these traditionally underserved groups are making
231
“continuous and substantial” academic progress. Essentially, these
requirements prevent schools from using their high-performing
students’ scores to mask the fact that they are neglecting students in
232
the traditionally low-performing subgroups. By hinging schools’
ability to make AYP on the success of these historically
disadvantaged groups, Congress has forced schools to provide equal
233
educational opportunities for students in each subgroup.
2. No Child Left Behind and an Adequacy-Based Right to
Education. The second half of NCLB’s express purpose clarifies
exactly what “all children” are promised: “significant opportunity to
obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency
on challenging State academic achievement standards and state
234
academic assessments.”
This portion of NCLB’s “purpose”
provision speaks to Congress’s establishment of an adequacy-based
right to education.
An adequacy-based right to education guarantees students a
235
certain minimum level of proficiency. For example, in Leandro v.
236
State, a North Carolina education-finance case, the court held that
the state must provide students with four basic skills that will allow
237
them to succeed in the future. In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that students’ “right to an adequate education” meant that
the state must ensure that “each and every child” has attained seven
specific “capacities,” including “sufficient oral and written
communication skills . . . to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization” and “sufficient knowledge of economic, social,

230. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(i).
231. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II).
232. Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the Twenty-First
Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 333 (2010).
233. See Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 158–59 (2009)
(“NCLB’s requirement that adequate yearly progress goals be met by subgroups that include
both minorities and students with disabilities may be the prime motivator for schools to increase
the intensity of services given to both African-American children and children with disabilities.”
(footnote omitted)).
234. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (footnote omitted).
235. Christina Payne-Tsoupros, No Child Left Behind: Disincentives To Focus Instruction on
Students Above the Passing Threshold, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 471, 471 (2010).
236. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
237. Id. at 255.
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and political systems to enable the student to make informed
238
choices.” NCLB focuses on student achievement in three subject
239
areas—language arts, mathematics, and science —and pledges that
by the end of the 2013–2014 school year, every child in America will
240
be proficient in each.
NCLB assures this federal right to an adequate education
through several different strategies. Most obviously, NCLB
241
commands states to enact challenging standards. This requirement
closely corresponds with the notion that an adequacy-based right to
education guarantees a minimum bar below which academic
instruction cannot fall. States are then required to create rigorous
assessments that will measure whether students are actually receiving
242
an adequate education. In addition, states must administer the
NAEP biennially to ensure that individual states have not set the
243
minimum educational floor too low.
Perhaps most importantly, NCLB requires states to create plans
that ensure that every teacher of a core subject in the state is “highly244
qualified.” To be “highly-qualified,” teachers must have at least a
bachelor’s degree, must satisfy all state certification requirements,
245
and must have a high level of competency in their assigned subjects.
Numerous studies have identified teacher quality as the top
246
determinant of student success. Therefore, requirements that would
place an effective teacher in every classroom are a critical part of
providing students with an adequate education.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C).
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F).
Id. § 6311(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A), (C).
Id. § 6311(c)(2).
Id. § 6319(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 7801(23).
See, e.g., DAN GOLDHABER WITH EMILY ANTHONY, TEACHER QUALITY AND
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 7–9 (ERIC Clearinghouse on Urb. Educ., Urban Diversity Ser. No.
115, 2003), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED477271.pdf (presenting studies
demonstrating that student achievement is best predicted by “teacher quality”); Derek W.
Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not Equal, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 107, 119 (2009) (noting research that shows “quality instruction is the most important
factor . . . in predicting academic success”).
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C. Comparing a Legislatively Recognized and a Court-Recognized
Right to Education
1. Similarities. Congress cannot absolutely guarantee that
schools will honor students’ rights to education, but neither can the
courts. The judiciary simply has the capacity to identify rights and
then to provide relief when those rights are violated. By enacting
NCLB and tasking the Department of Education with its
247
enforcement, Congress has effectively done the same thing. First, as
discussed in Section B, Congress has implicitly identified a federal
right to education grounded in both notions of equity and adequacy.
Then, Congress has preemptively established remedies should schools
violate students’ rights to education.
Were the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right to
education, plaintiffs presumably would not have available to them
248
any more remedies than NCLB already provides. Under NCLB,
schools whose students fail to obtain proficiency are identified for
249
improvement.
Students in these schools enjoy two kinds of
remedies. First, NCLB imposes strict requirements geared toward
immediately improving the education the school is providing. For
example, schools can be forced to reopen as charter schools, to
replace their entire staffs, or to submit to an executive state
250
takeover. In addition, schools “needing improvement” are required
to incorporate scientifically based research into their teaching
methods and to provide “high-quality professional development” to
all teachers and principals to help address the specific academic issues
251
the school is having. Second, NCLB provides a remedy to ensure
that students whose educational rights have been violated are
protected thenceforward. Students in schools that have failed to meet
252
AYP are entitled to transfer to a higher-performing school, or they
can force their schools to provide supplemental instructional
253
services. Together, these sanctions serve to protect students’ federal
254
rights to education in the same way judicial remedies would.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
For counterarguments to this proposition, see infra Part IV.C.3.
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
Id. § 6316(b)(3)(A)(iii).
Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B), (e)(1).
See infra Part IV.C.3.
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2. Congressional Superiority. Not only is Congress able to
provide equivalent remedies, but in many ways, the protection
available under NCLB is superior to the protection the Court could
provide by recognizing a fundamental right to education. To begin
with, Congress’s ability to enforce both the right and its remedies is
far superior to the Supreme Court’s. As the states’ lethargic reaction
to Brown illustrated, the Court has very little leverage actually to
255
induce states to take action. Congress, by contrast, has the power of
the purse and can employ this formidable bargaining chip as a means
256
of ensuring state compliance. In accordance with this principle,
NCLB establishes harsh sanctions for states that violate students’
implicit rights to education. The secretary of education is authorized
to withhold all federal funding from states that fail to establish
257
challenging standards or rigorous statewide assessments.
Institutional-competence considerations similarly weigh in favor
of a legislatively enforced right to education. Since the federal
judiciary’s first foray into public education in Brown, the Court has
repeatedly insisted that it is ill equipped to correct problems in
258
American schools. Judges lack both the administrative capacity to
evaluate potential educational reforms and the training to make
259
critical policy decisions. Consequently, judicial inquiries are usually
limited to comparing concrete, tangible factors like physical facilities,
260
instructional materials, and budgets,
and their remedies are

255. See Jack Greenberg, Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation
and Beyond, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 919, 983 (2010) (“Desegregation in the United States was
hobbled from the outset by ‘massive resistance,’ as school districts did not even pretend to
comply with Brown.”).
256. See supra Part I.C.
257. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g).
258. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (explaining that “few, if any,
judges are qualified” to devise remedies in segregated school districts).
259. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption
of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1253 (2006)
(“Courts . . . must look at problems one case at a time, which may prevent them from taking an
appropriately global view of a given issue. They must rely on the information presented by the
parties and their amici or engage in their own independent inquiry. But the parties’ data may be
skewed to support only one side of the dispute, and courts typically lack the resources—the
time, the expertise, the sheer manpower—to collect and digest vast amounts of extra-record
data.” (footnotes omitted)).
260. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 191–93 (Ky. 1989)
(documenting the lower courts’ findings of fact on the efficiency of the local school system—
findings based on facilities, personnel, and instructional materials).
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261

necessarily couched in abstract directives. Congress, by contrast, can
delve into the minutiae by consulting experts and holding legislative
hearings, and it therefore regularly makes policy decisions with
262
confidence.
Congress’s institutional competence is also superior in terms of
regulatory power. Because Congress can delegate enforcement
responsibilities to the Department of Education, it can regulate
schools’ observance of students’ rights in a manner the Court cannot.
Whereas the Court must rely on individuals to bring a case or
controversy, Congress, in conjunction with the Department of
Education, can constantly police violations and exact immediate
corrective action. This ability, in turn, largely eliminates the
sometimes-insurmountable issues of litigation costs and unequal
access to the American court system. Because Congress and the
Department of Education serve as constant watchdogs, they are able
to intervene on behalf of many students who otherwise would
probably be unable to vindicate their rights.
3. Counterarguments. This contention—that the protections
students enjoy under NCLB are equivalent to the protections
students would have enjoyed had Rodriguez formalized a right to
education—faces two obvious counterarguments.
First, one could highlight the fact that the Department of
Education has not effectively enforced NCLB’s stringent
requirements, despite its authorization to do so. Although countless
schools have been restructured and restaffed pursuant to Department
of Education mandates, the agency has yet to revoke completely any
state’s federal funding, and numerous studies suggest that NCLB has
263
not improved academic achievement markedly, if at all. This first

261. See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (instructing the school board
to devise a plan that will provide “meaningful assurance of prompt and effective
disestablishment of a dual system”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering
school districts to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”).
262. Lemos, supra note 259, at 1251–53; Sean Mulryne, Comment, A Tripartite Battle Royal:
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Assertion of Separation-of-Powers Principles, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 279, 317 (2008).
263. See generally ROBERT MANWARING, EDUC. SECTOR, RESTRUCTURING
‘RESTRUCTURING’: IMPROVING INTERVENTIONS FOR LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS AND
DISTRICTS (2010), available at http://www.educationsector.org/usr_doc/Restructuring.pdf
(describing the corrective actions taken in states throughout the country pursuant to NCLB and
charting by state the number of schools in restructuring); Regina Ramsey James, How To Mend
a Broken Act: Recapturing Those Left Behind by No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683
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criticism, though sound, is not uniquely applicable to the
congressionally created remedies available under NCLB. As
discussed in Section C.2, because of various institutional-competence
considerations, the courts are ill suited and ill equipped to compel
264
state compliance in the realm of education. Moreover, were the
judiciary to formalize a right to education, the catalogue of potential
remedies the courts could make available to rectify violations would
likely be identical to the remedies available under NCLB. One could
put forward a compelling argument that these remedies are
ineffective as means of improving academic achievement, but that
argument would not be rebutted by appointing the courts to be the
primary guardians of the right to education. Thus, although the
proposition that the sanctions available under NCLB should be
refined and employed more effectively is important—and almost
certainly correct—the same proposition would hold true if those
sanctions were instead available pursuant to a court’s holding.
The second counterargument is far more persuasive and suggests
a new goal around which education reformers might mobilize.
Although NCLB implicitly preserves a liberty interest and establishes
remedies to help protect that interest, the statute creates no private
right of action. Thus, whereas a constitutional right to education
would allow individuals to obtain judicial review and vindicate their
265
rights through litigation,
under NCLB, students are entirely
dependent on Congress and the Department of Education to
vindicate their rights and are left vulnerable if those two
organizations opt not to act.
In practice, the absence of a private right of action is not nearly
so significant as it seems in theory. Because students are free to
transfer out of any school that fails to provide an adequate and
266
267
equitable education as that concept is defined by NCLB, students
retain a key instrument for vindicating their rights. Moreover,
although evidence suggests that the Department of Education’s

(2010) (describing the ways in which NCLB has “fallen far short of its lofty expectations and
objectives”).
264. See supra Part IV.C.2.
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a private right of action for individuals whose
constitutional or statutory rights have been violated by an actor acting “under color of” state
law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–68 (1908) (affirming a federal right of action for
equitable relief against government officials who have violated federal law).
266. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006).
267. See supra Part IV.B.

BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/25/2012 10:42 PM

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF RODRIGUEZ

1065

efforts to revolutionize schools in need of improvement have not yet
268
been successful, the problem has not been agency inaction. A
thorough analysis of the value of private rights of action, as compared
to protection by the administrative state, falls outside the bounds of
this Note. But, in all likelihood, the availability of a private right of
action would not alter the list of schools that are already subject to
sanctions under NCLB, nor would it alter the sanctions that are
already in place at those schools. Nevertheless, lobbying Congress to
establish a private right of action under NCLB is probably a more
realistic strategy for education reformers than convincing the Court
to recognize a constitutional right to education. If that strategy were
successful, it would provide students with another powerful—and
almost certainly more efficient—means of vindicating their rights.
CONCLUSION
The notion that the federal government has established an
implicit, legislatively created right to education will undoubtedly—
and understandably—be met with some skepticism. The concept of an
implicit, legislatively created right itself is novel, and some skeptics
will argue that such a right cannot exist. Other skeptics will rightly
argue that any advocate would prefer to bring a suit asserting a
constitutional right to education rather than to rely on a right implied
by legislation. Still others will highlight the flaws in NCLB that
diminish the law’s effectiveness, thereby diminishing the quality of
the right it confers.
Each of these criticisms is warranted. The goal of this Note,
however, is not to dispel all skepticism. This Note seeks simply to
spark consideration of what the educational landscape would actually
look like had the outcome of Rodriguez been different—namely,
whether the scope of the federal government’s involvement in
education would be even more expansive; whether the chasm
between students in wealthy school districts and those in poor school
districts would have narrowed; and whether it is possible that, even if
a superior right to education theoretically exists, the implicit right the
federal government has enshrined in NCLB is not actually so
different from the judicially created right to education the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez so desperately sought years ago.

268. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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Admittedly, some of the provisions of NCLB need revision, and
the Department of Education’s enforcement role could certainly be
heightened and refined. Ultimately, however, the plaintiffs’ goal in
the Rodriguez litigation was to ensure that no child in the Edgewood
School District in San Antonio would be left behind. Nearly forty
years later, the federal government has dedicated itself to achieving
that goal, a transition that suggests that overruling Rodriguez at this
point would actually have no cognizable effect.

